Institutional change and accountability: procedural ecology and defiance of the Brazilian case by Filgueiras, Fernando & Aranha, Ana Luiza
Institutional Change and Accountability:
Procedural Ecology and Defiance of the Brazilian Case 33
Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política, nº 28. Brasília, janeiro - abril de 2019, pp 33-64.
DOI: 10.1590/0103-335220192802
Fernando Filgueiras1, 2 e Ana Luiza Aranha3
Institutional change and accountability:
procedural ecology and defiance of the Brazilian case4
Introduction
The paper aims at analyzing institutional change theories to offer a 
theoretical contribution regarding the explanatory elements of insti-
tutional development. The main point of the paper is that the expla-
nation of institutions’ incremental changes must take into account 
both endogenous and exogenous factors, and also systemic variables 
that consider the interaction between institutions a key element. 
In order to analyze that hypothesis, the paper conducted a case 
study of institutions of the Brazilian accountability system. This case 
study is based on qualitative evidence gathered to analyze the recent 
changes under which federal accountability institutions underwent 
in Brazil. Leaders of the institutions at the center of the federal 
accountability system in Brazil were interviewed, including members 
of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF), the Federal Police (PF), 
the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU), the Federal Court 
of Accounts (TCU), the Federal Justice (JF) and the government 
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Ministries. The interviews helped to map the procedural ecology in 
the Brazilian case and to understand the direction of change in the 
institutions, according to how they performed in the control of the 
public administration and the fight against corruption. 
In the first section, the paper reviews the literature on institu-
tional change, focusing on the discussion of explanatory variables 
of change. In the second section, the paper discusses the literature 
on the Brazilian accountability institutions and their recent process 
of institutional change. In the third section, the paper presents the 
methodology and the qualitative evidence collected to explain the 
change process under way. In the last section, from the conclusion 
about the Brazilian case, the paper analyzes the importance of the 
concept of procedural ecology in the explanation of the institutional 
development process. 
Institutional change and incrementalism
The issue of institutional change has constituted a crucial element 
of political analysis. Institutions play a primordial role in society 
and, consequently, influence the results of government actions and 
policies. Institutions represent the rules of the game and they may 
be formal or informal (Hall and Taylor, 2003; Olsen, 2009). The 
progress made by the Political Science field includes the recogni-
tion of how important institutions are to development and social 
change processes. Understanding development processes means 
understanding that the fundamental analytical problem involved is 
how to constitute institutional causal mechanisms that can replace 
the exogenous factors associated to change (Rezende, 2010). By 
studying institutional change, the paper embraces a contemporary 
controversy in the specialized literature – there is no consensus as to 
what can and should be considered change’s causal factors.
Lindblom’s classic work states that incremental changes must be 
understood as a result of the rational nature of the decision making 
undertaken by political actors. The processes are incremental due 
to the high institutional costs associated to abrupt ruptures in the 
accumulated knowledge and in the institutions internal practices. 
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Institutional change is incremental because the context of change 
determines that small additional values will start to be added to 
the policies so that non incremental changes are, rationally, consi-
dered by the decision makers to be irrelevant or without any prac-
tical or contextual applicability (Lindblom, 1959). This concept of 
incremental change does not mean that a policy is transformed 
small step by small step. Institutional changes may take positive 
or negative directions whereby strategies can be reviewed in the 
course of their unfolding, or the context may impose defeats on the 
policy makers (Weiss; Woodhouse, 1992).What is fundamental is 
that institutional changes occur in contexts of uncertainty, which 
means that the decision making processes tend to try to transform 
policies by incremental amounts avoiding abrupt ruptures and 
with the aim of effectively achieving incremental changes in prac-
tices and results (Lindblom, 1959).
Incremental change processes represent marginal adjustments to 
complex rules, norms and voluntary obedience structures without 
which an institutional rupture would occur (North, 1990). Analy-
zing the institutional change process would mean then understan-
ding the catalyst of exogenous factors – the mechanisms that trigger 
institutional change. Understanding these mechanisms is essential 
to any analysis of institutional change processes and results. Institu-
tional changes are imperfect, without a definite course. A well-de-
signed institution is not an established solution, but a development 
process that can be activated under certain conditions. The problem 
of Political Science regarding institutional change is the need to 
identify the processes and determinants that increase or hamper the 
orderly effect of institutions (Olsen, 2009).
The study of institutional change would open up four analytical 
pathways, namely: (1) the theory of critical junctures, focusing on 
a development process; (2) theories that presuppose the existence 
of institutional malleability, which is explained by the actions of 
losing coalitions in the political process (3) studies that focuses on 
multidimensional aspects and the intentional and non-intentional 
effects of interactions in the explanation of change; (4) the action of 
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reformers, whereby, in the face of collective action problems, political 
agents prove themselves capable of undertaking reforms that generate 
change (Pierson, 2004). From this perspective, it is important to 
understand the institutional development process in an incremental 
way, in which the marginal gains emerge from the exogenous factors 
unleashed by events external to the institutions themselves.
On the other hand, institutional change processes can also 
be explained by endogenous factors – when causal elements of 
change stem from the behavior of the institutions’ internal agents 
in regard to the institutional forms and contexts (Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010). The political conflict is the result of the distribution 
and mobilization of resources, generating the change process. It is 
important to understand the way in which the agents interpret the 
allocation of political resources and unleash, internally, the process 
of change directed at their institutions. This can be either an effort 
to maintain the status quo or to provoke a rupture. The conflicts 
regarding resource distribution generate a space for debate about 
the institutional rules. The greater the degree of ambiguity, the 
larger the space for contestation from the internal agents, thereby 
creating a favorable context for endogenous change in the institu-
tions (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). 
According to this perspective, institutions are not necessarily 
stable and are susceptible to change. The agents act internally to 
modify the institutions and the way the political context defines 
their strategies is important. According to Mahoney and Thelen, 
understanding the agents’ strategies requires comprehend two 
elements: (1) whether the veto powers of those involved in the 
change process are strong or weak; (2) the degree of discretio-
nary power agents enjoy in interpreting rules and procedures and 
applying them. These two variables – discretionary power and veto 
power – allows the combination of the political context with insti-
tutional forms. From the interrelation between these two variables, 
it is possible to classify the institutional change strategies in four 
categories: (1) – displacement; (2) – layering; (3) – drift; and (4) – 
conversion (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).
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Thus, the literature acknowledges that understanding institu-
tional change involves exogenous and endogenous factors in the 
light of the formal and informal rules that regulate the institutions. 
In regard to the exogenous factors, critical junctures and political 
contexts are what matter in the change process. As for the endo-
genous factors, the behaviors and strategies adopted by the agents 
inside the institutions allow the grasping of the institutional change 
process. Both the studies of Pierson (2004) and Mahoney and Thelen 
(2010) understand the process of institutional change based on the 
relationship between agents and structures. However, this literature 
does not endeavor to understand institutions’ systemic dynamic. 
Besides the political context and the context of formal rules that 
delimit the relations between agents and institutional structures, we 
must also interpret the interactions among institutions as a systemic 
dynamic in which the relations between them are interdependent – 
the change process leads to the formation of institutional coalitions. 
In other words, apart from analyzing the rules in the light of insti-
tutional ambiguity, agents’ strategies, critical junctures or political 
contexts, it is also necessary to consider institutions interactions, in 
a context of a complex system of competencies and organizations 
in which situations of institutional conflict and cooperation make 
a difference in determining the result of change. The changes may 
encounter a veto or cooperative situation, according to the perfor-
mance of other institutions and the relations of interdependence 
among them.
DiMaggio e Powell (1983) identified the process of institutional 
definition – the process of structuring institutions – as being marked 
by the following elements: (1) the extent of interactions among 
organizations; (2) the emergence of domination and organizational 
coalitions; (3) an increase in the information load that organiza-
tions have to deal with; and (4) the development of mutual know-
ledge involved in a joint venture among the participants in the set 
of institutions. In other words, the institutional change process goes 
beyond the boundaries delimited by the organizations themselves 
and their respective competencies. The change can be interrupted 
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or vetoed altogether, according to the interactions among the insti-
tutions and the impact of the institutional rules may be positive or 
negative, according to the institutional ecology.
Consequently, institutional incrementalism depends on two 
analytical keys: (1) the interaction between the agents and the 
institutional structures; and (2) the systemic interaction among 
institutions. Systemic interaction among institutions, as defined by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), means the formation of an organi-
zational cluster within the sphere of the State that involves mutual 
knowledge concerning a common public venture undertaken by a 
set of institutions. The interactions can take the form of an organi-
zational coalition whereby the institutions come together around 
a common objective, or they may stem from institutional compe-
tition that undermines the impact of the development process of 
each institution in the organizational cluster. In this perspective, the 
development of shared knowledge and the control of information 
become essential to the constitution of organizational clusters that 
can imply the solidification of the status quo - reducing the impact of 
the change - or even the vetoing of any change at all (Galvin, 2012).
We understand procedural ecology as the interdependent rela-
tions of the institutions in a system in which the actions under-
taken by one institution depend on the actions of other institutions. 
This interdependency is fixed by formal and informal rules and 
procedures that involve a set of institutions focused on achieving a 
certain goal. Therefore, it is the system that fixes the ecology in such 
a way that the result depends on the institutions coordinated and 
cooperative action. 
An autonomous organization of the institutions intervenes in 
the change process. The cooperation and coordination of the activi-
ties depend on fixed institutional rules and, at the same time, on the 
establishment of political ties so that the actors of the institutions 
understand that the cooperation and coordination are vital for 
the success of the actions undertaken by the system. The essential 
elements for a procedural ecology to function are the knowledge 
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accumulated inside the institutions and the agents’ ability to control 
the information that results from their actions.
The chart below summarizes the discussion and displays the 
explanatory variables associated to institutional change:
Chart 1 - The explanatory variables of the institutional change process
Causal factor of institutional change Analytical focus of the change process Explanation of institutional change
Exogenous 
variables
Critical junctures, depen-
dence on the trajectory
Political and broader ins-
titutional situation
Shocks external to the institutions 
trigger institutional change
Endogenous 
variables
Factors associated with the 
distribution of resources 
among institutional agents
Organizational elements internal to 
the institutions (formal and informal)
Organizational changes lead to 
changes in the distribution of 
power among the agents  and 
the resignification of institutional 
objectives and processes
Systemic 
variables
Interaction among the institutions 
of an organizational cluster
Procedural ecology Formation of organizational 
coalitions, control of information, 
knowledge generation, institutional 
cooperation or conflict processes 
Source: elaborated by the authors
Based on this discussion, we advocate that the institutional 
change process, in addition to the exogenous and endogenous varia-
bles, depends on the procedural ecology and its system dynamics, 
whereby the interaction among institutions matters. These inte-
ractions are formal because they are embedded in the institutions’ 
procedures, competencies and functions, all directed at achieving a 
certain end. But it is also informal, because it depends on the shared 
knowledge between the institutions’ agents and on the processes of 
coordination and cooperation. In this case, the informal interactions 
depend on political conceptions, on the process of interpreting the 
rules and on the formation of organizational coalitions within the 
system of institutions.
In the next section we examine the case of the development of 
accountability institutions in Brazil, with particular attention to the 
systemic interactions and the institutional change process resulting 
from a recent modernization effort.
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The brazilian case – changes in accountability institutions 
system
In the beginning of the democratization process, in Latin 
America in general and in Brazil in particular, it was broadly advo-
cated that there was a lack of horizontal accountability and weak 
horizontal accountability institutions (O’Donnell, 1996).The Brazi-
lian democratization process meant a return to basic polyarchic 
conditions, in the light of a transition process that was a response 
to the crisis of the authoritarian regime implanted in 1964 (Santos, 
1998). In 1987, the Constituent Assembly faced the dilemma of 
making choices that would generate an institutional arrangement 
capable of efficiently aggregating and processing the growing pres-
sures stemming from an extremely heterogeneous and plural social 
context (Abranches, 1988).
The return to polyarchic conditions fostered a process of political 
openness that was essential for the democratic re-construction of 
the country. Parallel to that, the return of elections set in motion an 
incremental process of developing State’s institutions and, among 
them, the accountability institutions. Gradually, the established 
conditions enabled the consolidation of the democratic regime, 
especially in regard to the conditions of governability (Limongi, 
2006). Since then the political competition, the presence of opposi-
tions and clearer institutional rules have all contributed to the deve-
lopment of horizontal accountability institutions motivated by the 
fight against corruption and the expansion of checks and balances 
mechanisms (Melo, Pereira and Figueiredo, 2009). 
Political change in Brazil in the last fifteen years has led to a 
process of incremental development of accountability institutions 
(Taylor and Praça. 2014). However, the constitution of a political 
regime that guarantees governability conditions has had an asso-
ciated cost related to the conditions of democratic governance in 
the public sector. An antagonism has arisen between the exercise of 
political authority, on one hand, and the exercise of public autho-
rity in the field of government administration, on the other. The 
institutional change process has taken place incrementally, with 
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the gradual introduction of new rules and routines into the func-
tioning of institutions and the gradual increase and availability 
of additional resources. Furthermore, those incremental changes 
in the accountability institutions in Brazil empowered them to 
reveal various corruption scandals. This has led to a series of rule 
changes that have boosted the role played by those institutions in 
the Brazilian society (Taylor and Praça, 2014). A growing spiral of 
institutional incrementalism has stemmed from this process, aggre-
gating new functions to the accountability institutions in the light of 
the corruption scandals that they have revealed.
In regards to exogenous factors, the 1988 Constitution was the 
first critical juncture, because it determined the competences of a 
series of institutions responsible for the accountability system. The 
framework of institutional competences is linked to a theoretical 
discussion that understands that it is up to the government the 
exercise of the internal control over its own activities and it is up to 
the Legislative branch the external control (in Brazil, exercised with 
support of  the Federal Court of Accounts). Moreover, the Consti-
tution delegates to the Public Prosecutor´s Office powers to control 
the public administration civilly and criminally and to propose 
judicial and extra-judicial solutions.5 Another critical juncture 
was the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF) which attributed to the 
accountability institutions greater powers to control the actions of 
5  An out-of-court solution is a way of settling conflicts without going through a legal hearing. In Brazil, 
it is the prerogative of the Public Prosecutor´s Office to propose legal solutions in order to resolve 
conflicts. In order to exercise accountability and control the public administration, the prosecutors 
can propose recommendations and terms of conduct adjustment. The recommendation is solely 
the tool that prosecutors use to alert public officials about the need to resolve a situation that may 
be irregular or that can lead to one. The terms of conduct adjustment (TAC) is a legal instrument to 
obtain, from the causer of damage to diffuse and collective interests, an enforceable obligation of 
do’s and don’ts, by which whoever is responsible for the damage assumes the duty to align their 
conduct to the legal requirements, under penalty of sanctions laid down in the term.
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Brazilian State public bureaucracies, extending the powers of audit, 
account control, and control processes.6
In regards to endogenous factors, the institutions of the hori-
zontal accountability system in Brazil have been undergoing 
changes since 1988, and these changes have led to a new behavior 
pattern from their agents (Olivieri, Teixeira, Loureiro and Abrucio, 
2013). Endowed with a greater degree of autonomy, the accountabi-
lity agents adopted processes for interpreting the norms that turned 
them into political agents of fundamental importance to Brazilian 
democracy. Institutional change also derives from changes in the 
institutions´ routines, with the participation of the accountability 
agents. They influenced the implementation of the new rules, mobi-
lized resources to assure that the rules were enforced, controlled 
important public sector information and selected the way in which 
institutional choices could be made (Galvin, 2012).
Besides exogenous and endogenous factors, we will also consider 
the interdependences between the institutions to better explain the 
recent changes that affected Brazil. It is a solid consensus in the 
literature that horizontal accountability depends on the existence of 
institutions authorized and disposed to control, supervise, rectify 
and punish actions performed by public agents that are consi-
dered to be illicit by other agencies and that are divergent with the 
public interest. Therefore, horizontal accountability concerns the 
checks and balances mechanisms of the Republic’s three branches 
of government – the Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches. 
It is expected that their functioning is effective and that it does not 
6  The Fiscal Responsibility Law, created by the Complementary Law 101/2000, sought to bring 
together the initiatives to achieve altogether the consistent expansion of state efficiency and fiscal 
accountability to control public finances. The most striking aspect of this Law, in addition to the 
fiscal adjustment, was that it established several initiatives in the realm of transparency of public 
accounts processes – its Article 48, and 59. Regarding the extent of control, the Fiscal Responsibility 
Law distributed the control powers to the Federal Court of Accounts, the internal control system 
to the Executive branch - exercised today by the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) - and 
the Public Prosecutor´s Office. These institutions have the capacity to control the targets set in the 
Budget Guidelines Law, the public expenditure on personnel and the public debt. By reaffirming 
these empowerments, the Law created a favorable institutional framework for operation of the 
internal and external control instruments in the Brazilian government.
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result from the isolated performance of each one but, instead, from 
the complex network of institutions (O’Donnell, 1999).
The institutions of the accountability system must be autono-
mous and well empowered to inspect, control, correct and punish 
any illicit acts in order to defend the public interest. The system of 
accountability institutions means a complex network within which 
the institutional competences are specific, but the actions of each 
institution depend on a process of institutional sequencing and 
cooperation with other institutions (Mainwaring, 2003). In the 
Brazilian case, the network of institutions is extensive, embracing 
the three branches of government and the media. Notwithstanding, 
at the very center of the network there are only four institutions, 
namely the Federal Court of Accounts, the Federal Public Prose-
cutor´s Office, the Federal Police and the Office of the Federal 
Comptroller General. These four are responsible for inspecting, 
controlling, correcting and instructing legal actions taken against 
public administrators and politicians in cases of corruption, misa-
ppropriation, embezzlement or any other divergence from the 
public interest.
The Federal Court of Accounts is a body of the National Congress 
and was founded in 1891. Since then Federal Court of Accounts has 
advised several decisions of the National Congress and established 
actions of control of the administration. In the 1988 Federal Consti-
tution, it is the responsibility of this Court to exercise external control 
over the public administration by undertaking audits and informing 
the Legislative branch about the correct use of public resources on the 
part of public agents. Recently, the Federal Court of Accounts has left 
aside its more legalistic attribution and has strengthened its authority 
to audit the performance and spending of the public administration 
(Speck, 2000). This was a critical juncture for the Court, because the 
LRF changes in the entrenched practices within its administration. 
Another critical juncture that brought greater changes for the Federal 
Court of Accounts was the enactment of the already mentioned 
Law of Fiscal Responsibility. It added administrative practices and 
auditing to the Court´s responsibilities and brought new regulations 
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and the need to modernize its internal practices and invest in techno-
logy (Loureiro, Teixeira, and Cacique, 2009). 
In the case of the Federal Public Prosecutor´s Office, the 1988 
Constitution brought another critical juncture, insofar as the cons-
titutional provisions guaranteed its functional and administrative 
autonomy, freeing it from political influences and empowering it to 
act in the public sphere. The Office takes on one of the functions of 
the Judicial branch, since it is charged with defending collective and 
diffuse social interests. It is also charged with defending the demo-
cratic regime, in particular the protection of the nation’s public and 
social patrimony. The competences of the Office’s have a broader 
outreach, and, for the purpose of the present research, the essential 
function performed by the Office is the one of horizontal accounta-
bility: it has the authority to take legal action against public admi-
nistrators and elected politicians. In the case of the Office, a strong 
dose of political will on the part of its members has been added 
to its institutional incrementalism change and the socialization of 
that volition occurs in defense of a society that has been rendered 
apathetic in the face of a State faced by a myriad of corruption 
scandals (Arantes, 2011a).
The same process occurred with the Federal Police. Given its 
role of police force of the Federal State, it conducts criminal inves-
tigations in cases of penal infractions contravening the public and 
social order to the detriment of goods, services or interests of the 
Federal government or of its autarchies and public corporations as 
well as investigates other crimes with inter-state or international 
repercussions that need to be uniformly suppressed. The Constitu-
tion recognized it as a permanent government body and formally 
structured its careers. The permanent characteristic meant that, 
even though it was subordinate to the Executive Branch, it could 
not be dissolved by the government. In the second case, the struc-
turing of its careers meant that there are established rules governing 
access to the respective positions and that there is a settled internal 
hierarchy with clear rules regarding ascension and the sub-divisions 
of the body. In the internal socialization of Federal Police agents 
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and senior officers there is a strong component of repressive action 
against organized crime and corruption associated to the strengthe-
ning of democracy (Arantes, 2011b).
Lastly, the creation of the Office of the Comptroller General 
in 2003 was the result of a long process of incrementalism in the 
internal audit of the federal government. Prior to the creation of the 
CGU, the internal control was achieved by a decentralized system, 
spread by various government administration entities and coor-
dinated by the Internal Control Federal Department attached to 
the Ministry of Finance (Olivieri, 2010).7 The Office of the Comp-
troller General was created by Act 10683/2003, concentrating all 
Federal Government’s internal audit activities as well as initiatives 
directed at combating corruption. Prior to its creation, the Execu-
tive Branch´s decentralized internal audit was disorganized and 
ineffective, both in its performance of audits and in the evaluation 
of management practices (Balbe, 2013).
The 1998 Constitution and the return of democracy in Brazil 
constituted a trigger to a process of incremental change in the 
accountability institutions. Firstly, because it placed at the insti-
tutional center a considerable and complex chain of competences, 
rules and processes. Secondly, because it inevitably led to organi-
zational and practical changes in the interior of those institutions. 
Thus, from a situation of a complete lack of horizontal accoun-
tability, Brazil achieved incremental changes in accountability 
institutions that led to the development of new practices in the 
public administration and the gradual empowerment of the accou-
ntability institutions. The overall result has been the development 
of a system of accountability institutions with exclusive and supe-
rimposed competencies directed at preventing, investigating and 
punishing illicit acts in the sphere of the political system and public 
administration (Taylor and Praça, 2014).
7 It is important to emphasize that the centralization of the internal audit did not always occur only 
within the scope of the Ministry of Finance. In some moments these activities were transferred to 
the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management.
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Institutional changes came about as a reaction to the critical 
junctures imposed by corruption scandals and the new Constitution 
as the exogenous factors, as well as from organizational and socia-
lizing changes of the institutions agents, as the endogenous factor. 
The scenario unfold anti-corruption policies in the following ways: 
(1) – the dissemination of anti-corruption policies in view of the 
fact that Brazil had become a signatory of international conventions 
against corruption; (2) - the layering of new organizational formats 
of public administration, such as the creation of the CGU and the 
greater autonomy of the Federal Police, with the co-existence of new 
and old institutional formats; and (3) - the conversion of institutions, 
such as the Federal Court of Accounts, which took on more powers 
and autonomy, established by the Constitution and by the LRF. 
The constitutional organization of accountability institutions 
catalyzed a gradual enhancement of the State’s capacity to control 
and supervise the bureaucracy and this has brought about incre-
mental changes in each institutions. However, these incremental 
changes did not result in any incentives for institutional coopera-
tion (Taylor and Buranelli, 2007). Both the democratization process 
in Brazil and the unveiling of corruption created critical junctures 
that brought about considerable changes in each institution of the 
accountability system. As for the endogenous factors, incremen-
talism led to considerable learning on the part of the agents and 
generated a lot of information and many control actions.
The accrued learning endowed the agents with greater capacity 
for action (Olivieri, Teixeira, Loureiro and Abrucio, 2013), but it 
also gave them control of information and actions that were used as 
a political resource by the accountability institutions (Gailmard and 
Patty, 2007). The changes in the institutions of the Brazilian accou-
ntability system did not result in a more systemic development 
that would involve the process of interaction, interdependence and 
complementariness that each institution maintains with each other 
in the light of the procedural ecology of their activities of control, 
audit, investigation and punishment of corruption.
Institutional Change and Accountability:
Procedural Ecology and Defiance of the Brazilian Case 47
The interactions among horizontal accountability institutions, in 
the light of the agent’s broad volition, reduced the impacts of control 
actions insofar as the procedural ecology created incentives for 
institutional disputes and barriers to sequenced control activities. 
In Brazil, the interaction process is marked by the interdependence 
of accountability institutions, since the institutional rules overlap. 
Increasing the interaction between the institutions of the accounta-
bility system does not lead to a cooperative or coordinated process 
of joint actions, since the organizations rationally struggle for their 
recognition by the public opinion and have quite strong political 
interests. In this sense, the information that the accountability 
institutions began to hold served as a strategic resource to ensure 
the realization of their interests and a favorable public opinion. 
In other words, the institutions began to withhold information 
and control actions that responded to exogenous and endogenous 
factors determining institutional change. On one hand, in the case 
of the exogenous factors, the information served to address the 
critical junctures of corruption scandals, in which the institutions 
fought for a favorable public opinion. On the other hand, infor-
mation was a strategic resource that served the interests of the 
institutional actors, in respect to their broader political interests. 
The information acquired by bureaucratic organizations is instru-
mentally used. The agents decide how the information is used and 
passed on (Gailmard and Patty, 2013).
The change in the system of accountability institutions in Brazil 
was not accompanied by an environmental change in the inte-
ractions between these institutions and was not able to produce 
coordinated and cooperative actions or ensure rational sequen-
cing of activities aimed at improving accountability. Incremental 
changes did not affect the systemic variables, being restricted to 
a logical closure and differentiation of each of the accountability 
system elements. The interactions between the institutions of the 
accountability is bound by rigidly defined procedural competences 
and largely uncoordinated procedural processes, driven by political 
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forces stemming from the critical junctures of corruption scandals 
and the political interests of agents. 
The next section explores this hypothesis about the procedural 
ecology and interactions between accountability institutions in Brazil. 
Methodology, evidences and analysis
In order to understand the current scenario of procedural ecology 
among Brazilian accountability institutions, the paper analyzes 
interviews with the civil servants of the institutions under study. 
The purpose of the interviews was to understand how the system 
of accountability institutions works from the point of view of its 
agents: which points they consider to be critical in the interactions 
between the institutions, whether the coordination between them 
exists or whether it is still a frontier to be surpassed and what has 
been the direction of institutional change since the democratization 
process began. The reasons for the choice of the interview technique 
are several. Not only it makes possible to get to know the effective 
functioning of the institutions, starting from the assumption that that 
functioning does not derive from institutional norms and rules alone, 
but also that there are certain spheres of practice and organizational 
culture that can influence the forms of interpretation and applica-
tion of the rule. Interviews are particularly revealing if the goal is 
to capture what people did or planned to do, such as the decision to 
establish interactions with other accountability institutions.
The selection of respondents followed the criteria for institu-
tional placement and work experience in the area. We attempted to 
interview people who have an important role in the formation of 
the control and accountability policy, who are trained and strate-
gically positioned to provide opinions and views on the procedural 
ecology of the accountability institutions system in Brazil.
The interviews were conducted from May 2014 to May 2015. 
Fifty-one federal civil servants who work in the four selected insti-
tutions – the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU), the Federal 
Court of Accounts (TCU), the Office of the Public Prosecutor´s 
Office (MPF) and the Federal Police (PF) – who hold key positions 
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within their institutions. The civil servants interviewed hold mana-
gement and coordination positions, being responsible for the core 
activities of their respective bodies. Briefly, it can be said that they 
are mostly civil servants with a long history in the Brazilian public 
service. Many of them, before entering their respective institutions, 
had already held other public office - which indicates that they 
have an extensive knowledge and experience in the field of public 
administration. In addition to that, they have several years of career 
within their own institution, which means that they have a broad 
notion of the inner work and challenges.
Table 1 – Respondents per institution, Brazil, 2014-2015
Institution Frequency
Office of General Comptroller (CGU) 13
Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) 15
Public Prosecutor´s Office (MPF) 13
Federal Police (PF) 10
Total 51
Source: CRIP, 2016.
In this paper, the interviews were analyzed and grouped in two 
thematic block, that related to the two dimensions of procedural 
ecology – cooperation and information. We sought to capture 
the kind of logic involved in the interactions between the accou-
ntability institutions (i.e. whether it is competitive or collabora-
tive logic) and, secondly, how institutions treat and handle their 
information (including the informational obstacles institutions 
build and how they act as inhibitors of higher levels of interac-
tion). Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured data 
collection instrument. The choice of this instrument was justified 
because the agents interviewed represent a bureaucratic elite. 
In elite interviews, the semi-structures questionnaire allows the 
respondents to present their answers within their own words, 
delineating the general framework about the role and interactions 
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among accountability institutions, as well as the issue of corrup-
tion control in Brazil (Aberback and Rockman, 2002).
The logic behind the interactions: competition or cooperation?
The analysis of the interviews tended to reinforce the assump-
tions outlined in the literature review: in general, there is a visible 
lack of coordinated interactions and the predominance of a compe-
titive relationship between the institutions - “it is a job done more or 
less arbitrarily without coordination among the institutions”(Res-
pondent 2, MPF, 2014). The interactions do occur, but by way of 
a predatory competition between the accountability institutions, 
which are greatly concerned about media attention and usually do 
not focus on symbiotic cooperation and exchanges. Respondents, 
in general, reaffirmed that significant changes did occur in each of 
the institutions of the system. However, the system still lacks coor-
dinated and joint action, thereby hampering the progress of cases.
At first, the causes for the competitive logic were sought in 
personal explanations: vanity and reluctance to share the merit of 
investigations. Furthermore, the interactions between the institu-
tions responded to the political juncture. Depending on the political 
juncture, the body can be open to the interactions or averse to them. 
However, apart from personal limitations and political reasons, 
the answers allow us to draw a scenario of institutional crystal-
lization, characterized by inflexibility and a moving away from 
each other. In the words of a Prosecutor, the accountability insti-
tutions in Brazil are very firmly attached to their own role and 
competence. The Brazilian system of accountability is typified by 
the respondents as an assembly line. Each institution fulfills its 
role and sequences the activities. Thus, the institutions are not 
perceived as being aimed at coordinating. Depending on the insti-
tutional origin, the respondents portray their role as something 
unique that can be resolved internally, without the need to coordi-
nate with other accountability institutions. For instance, this is the 
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case of the interactions in the case of Special Audits, involving the 
Federal Courts of Accounts and the CGU.8
This excessive independence at least is perceived as something 
harmful. For the most part, Brazil lacks an “institutional culture” 
focused on coordination. The worst possible outcome would stem 
from institutions that do not communicate; they do not know what 
each one is investigating and monitoring – something that they call 
“institutional blindness”. This appears, for example, in the relations 
between the Federal Courts of Accounts and the Office of the Comp-
troller General and within the sphere of the MPF itself. The structure 
of the relationship between accountability institutions in Brazil was 
perceived by 80% of the respondents, who affirm that they are small 
islands, dispersed and without a more solid joint action. 
Why do I say blindness? Sometimes it happened that a colleague 
who works in the civil arena was investigating a situation and 
the colleagues in the crime arena did not even know. […] 
Sometimes people in crime were hitting each other with a case 
of corruption in which there was already a civil investigation 
and we did not even know it, and the civil investigation 
already had all the necessary evidence, but since there was no 
centralized anti-corruption coordination, sometimes internal 
contact was difficult (Respondent 12, MPF, 2014).
Hence, the coordination among institutions in the Brazilian 
accountability system is associated to an institutional blindness, 
with an overlay of various institutions acting in the same case. 
Respondents perceive that coordination is not sufficiently fluid 
8  The Special Accounts Instrument (Tomada de Contas Especial) is used by the control institutions 
in Brazil to compensate for the losses regarding public resources and has its own formal rite. It 
can only be evoked after all other measures of damage repair have been exhausted and failed. As 
stated in the Instruction / TCU No. 71 of 11.28.2012, it is the responsibility of the CGU to issue the 
report about Special Accounts processes and give an opinion as to whether the facts have been 
properly investigated, which rules or regulations have been infringed. It has also to ensure the 
correct identification of the responsible and determinate the amount of the damage and of any 
possible repayments. The Federal Court of Accounts can also start this instrument and is the only 
responsible to judge the Special Account and take appropriate measures to redress the damage.
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and this would negatively affect the outcome of the accountability 
system’s procedural ecology.
The institutions do not perceive themselves as part of the same 
organizational cluster, the same procedural ecology around an 
accountability system. This lack of collective identity, as being 
part of the same process, would be what leads to a duplication 
of structures, with the creation of parallel procedures and even 
parallel organizations, instead of deepening the interactions and 
coordination with the institutions that already exist. The problem is 
often narrated as a matter of the institutions indiference of its own 
functions and powers in the accountability system. Without this 
prior self-knowledge, interactions are severely damaged, because 
it is difficult to discern the complementary areas. For example, the 
public prosecutors many times do not understand the role of the 
other institutions of the system: “demands from the prosecution 
can justify a specific audit or not, for example, a trip to one muni-
cipality. The vast majority does not justify this because it would 
be impractical. We receive about a thousand demands per month” 
(Respondent 25, CGU, 2014).
The difficulties for institutional cooperation exist, but they do not 
mean that the interactions between the institutions do not occur. 
Respondents report that these interactions within the accountabi-
lity system occur informally, especially between the Comptroller 
and the Federal Police. But, in the absence of a broader structured 
accountability system, the interactions occur more due to informal 
exchanges. All respondents pointed out that informal contacts 
matter more than formal rules. 
There is no effective coordination, especially when the prero-
gatives and competences clash, leaving it up to the volition of 
agents within the institutions of the system to establish cooperation 
efforts. The problem seems to be the lack of a “strategic integration”, 
designed from above, with clear objectives. Different institutions do 
not know their own roles, even less the role of others and how they 
can beneficially help their work. There is an absence of a strategic 
definition of system priorities – the rule is that each institution 
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sets its own priority and reluctant to answer the calls and requests 
coming from other parts of the accountability system.
The best examples of coordination occur exactly when there is 
mutual knowledge and information sharing. For example, between 
the Comptroller and the Police, they call each other to help in 
investigations and Special Operations – the CGU offers expertise in 
analyzing government data and the PF offers physical protection for 
the auditors. This proximity allowed them to understand each one´s 
role in the accountability system. 
The other crucial point for the procedural ecology to take place 
in the direction of coordination efforts is the level of information 
exchange, analyzed in the next section. 
Exchange of information
The other difficulty highlighted in relation to the coordination 
between the institutions comes from the absence of a systematic 
exchange of information. Each institution has its own database, 
which is not usually shared, at least not in an effective way. It is 
impossible to exercise accountability without the integration of 
information and the principle of publicity. In this sense, the first 
dimension is closely linked to the second one: the major obstacle to 
an accountability system in which the institutions act in a coordi-
nated and integrated manner is the lack of integration between the 
information generated by each institution. 
This means that the institutions engage in a competitive logic, 
fighting for space in the public sphere, especially with regards to 
control and publicity of information about corruption. This logic 
prevents fruitful exchanges of information and the sharing of 
databases, making it impossible to achieve an integrated network. 
Without this space for informational intersection, the final result in 
terms of accountability would be jeopardized.
On one hand, we find that the performance of the accountabi-
lity actors takes place in the dimension of institutional autonomy 
combined with an internal learning that creates little incentive for 
institutional cooperation or for the procedural ecology efficiency. On 
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the other hand, as respondents pointed out, the major obstacle to a 
more integrated and coordinated accountability system is the absence 
of a systematic exchange of information between the institutions. 
The problem of information exchange has three dimensions 
within the accountability system (1) – among institutions; (2) - the 
problem of secrets and secrecy foreseen in the Brazilian legislation; 
(3) - information as a strategic resource to further the interests of the 
agents. Not only the institutions do not share data between them, but 
they also state the difficulties in obtaining data even when they have 
a warrant (especially from banks and the Federal Revenue Office). 
Moreover, some institutions build a strong relationship with 
the media, leaking information in an intended way. Regarding the 
exchange of information among institutions, we tested the network 
of contacts established between the institutions under analysis. 
Surprisingly, the vast majority of respondents said that they never 
had any denied contact: “denying a contact with another institution 
at the federal level is an arbitrary form of behavior, no one has the 
courage to do it” (Respondent 26, TCU, 2014). But if denying is 
not the rule, slowness and delays are. There are complaints from 
all parts of the accountability system about the lack of agility in 
information sharing. There are excessive delays in obtaining crucial 
information for investigations, for example. 
When respondents elaborate more on their responses, it becomes 
clear the existence of communication barriers beyond the denial: 
“one thing is having the access denied, another is when you are trying 
to communicate and that communication does not evolve, there is no 
answer, there are communication barriers.” (Respondent 48, CGU, 
2014). The reality is that institutions do not clearly and openly deny 
contacts or information (which would be a break in constitutional 
principles), but they do set difficulties and obstacles to bar the access 
to the information. It is important to note that the contacts and this 
process of information exchange often occur informally, without 
any institutional provision for the use of strategic information by the 
institutions of the system. These informal exchanges and rules do 
not create binding decisions, grounded in a solid process and with a 
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defined flow. They strengthen the discretionary power of the agents 
who have this information as a strategic resource.
Regarding the second issue, Brazilian law rigidly determines tax 
confidentiality and legal secrecy, imposing strict rules for the finan-
cial system to protect the confidentiality and privacy of its clients.9 
Specially at the Federal Court of Accounts, there is a widespread 
criticism of the difficulties in accessing tax and financial secrets. Its 
members highly regret the absence of institutional procedures that 
are allowed only to other institutions of the accountability system, 
such as the Federal Police and its power to breach the confiden-
tiality rule. Far from being seen as potentially beneficial, the seals 
of secrecy are questioned all the time as major obstacles to the 
internal work of the institutions and, in particular, to the interac-
tions between them.
In this aspect, the TCU shows itself to be a different institu-
tion – it is the one that most questions the existence of the secrecy 
and the impossibility of breaking it. In this case, there is a competi-
tion for police instruments. The competitive logic is so entrenched 
that accountability institutions in Brazil fight for top positions in 
the system and dispute others’ institutional procedures. This type of 
dispute reflects a system of institutions that cannot establish stra-
tegic actions and processes of exchange of information and data. 
It is necessary to define better and more clearly the roles of each 
institution, establishing coordination mechanisms and a stronger 
procedural ecology.
9  In Brazil, tax confidentiality is regulated by the Complementary Law 105 of 2001, which establishes 
that all financial organizations are forbidden to provide any information about their customers or 
citizens of Brazil. The breakdown of tax and financial secrecy can only be achieved through a legal 
process and the express permission of the Judiciary. This Law is in opposition to the process of 
enhancing governmental transparency resulting from the Law 12.527 of 2011, which addresses 
the access to public information. The latter stipulated transparency procedures and the principle 
of publicity as the basic condition (the secrecy is the exception). It also stipulated the viability and 
necessity of transparency portals throughout the Brazilian public service, including the organizations 
from the three branches of power and the public prosecutors, in all three levels of the federation 
(at the federal, state and municipal level). Under the Law of Access to Information, tax secrecy 
remained a possibility but an exception to the norm of publicity. This was contrary to the interests 
of the Court of Accounts and of the Comptroller General, who wanted access to tax data to inform 
controlling processes and to tackle corruption.
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The Brazilian Federal Revenue and the banks are systematically 
placed as the villains of the access to information and the establish-
ment of interactions. In the case of the banks, they systematically 
disobey court decisions about sharing banking information. For 
example, CGU and MPF face enormous obstacles when they need 
to access the bank accounts of mayors: “If you ask me if we have had 
any negative contact of any federal entity that has prevented us from 
our work against corruption, I answer: Yes, federal banks, alleging, 
in my view unjustifiably, bank secrecy.” (Interview 25, CGU, 2014). 
In the case of the Federal Revenue, even with judicial authorization, 
it does not usually deliver the data requested by other institutions. 
In this sense, access to information appears as a powerful bargai-
ning tool. Many institutions staunchly protect themselves behind 
secrecy rules. These rules are important in many cases but, unfortu-
nately, they are so impregnated in the control bureaucracies that it 
becomes truly impossible to investigate malfeasance.
Finally, the control of information retained by accountability 
agents is presented as a key strategic resource. The logic behind the 
dispute between the institutions is not only about the procedures, 
but it is also about public opinion. Given the context in which 
the institutional capacities to unveil corruption were increased, 
accountability institutions start to play to the audience in order to 
consolidate their interests in the political arena. Combining the 
strongly proactive attitudes of the agents with a structure that does 
not create incentives for institutional cooperation, information 
becomes a strategic resource, both to pressure the political system 
and to increase the legitimacy of their actions in the eyes of society. 
The result of this procedural ecology is that in the context of a 
structure with few incentives for institutional cooperation, based 
mostly on the proactive actions of its agents and on informal ways of 
information exchange, the Brazilian system of accountability insti-
tutions ends up challenging the institutional change. Within these 
institutions, taken individually, there were incremental changes that 
increased state capacity to exercise control of public policies and 
unveil corruption cases both in politics and public administration. 
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However, the challenge is to consider that, in addition to incre-
mental changes that empower the accountability institutions in the 
Brazilian state, we must also consider the highly informal and less 
systematic procedural ecology that encourages competition, the 
absence of solid procedures for control activity sequencing and of 
dynamic data exchange, the deliberate creation of obstacles and the 
political use of information. 
Discussion and Conclusion
Systems are mutual interactions between complex elements, 
providing knowledge and a common cause to its elements, which 
interact to achieve an end (Bertalanffy, 1968). Systems theory 
proposes that systems can be open or closed. The advancement 
of theories of social systems, since Parsons (1969), considers that 
the systems are open, emphasizing the elements of exchanges with 
regard to knowledge, information, people and resources. However, 
as pointed out by Luhmann (2000), the condition for the establish-
ment of exchange between systems is that each of them should 
be closed so that they can establish differentiation with respect to 
other systems. The closure is in relation to its own operative basis, 
differing from all the rest and creating its operating limits. By doing 
that, the systems create conditions for establishing their openness 
to the environment, opening them also to external demands that 
arise from the internal conditions they created (Luhmann, 2000). 
Our theoretical advance is to consider that in addition to closing 
and logical response to the demands, the process through which 
exchanges smoothly and interdependently take place should be 
considered in the analysis. In this case, the concept of procedural 
ecology does that, by looking at systemic variables in the process of 
institutional change.
Cooperation or conflict between institutions of a given system 
is a necessary condition but not sufficient to explain the process 
of institutional change. Conflict, as well as cooperation may be the 
elements that explain the change or determine a process of change. 
On their own, cooperation and conflict are situational variables. 
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However, cooperation or conflict between institutions is essential to 
explain the change brought about by systemic bias, since they can 
alter the results of the interaction between system elements as well 
as indicate the direction of change. Conflict can result in positive 
changes, as well as cooperation between institutions can result in 
negative changes. In any case, the condition for thinking about the 
influence of conflict or cooperation on the process of institutional 
change is the existence of a procedural ecology. 
The systemic variables need be consider when analyzing the 
process of institutional change, in which the interactions between 
institutions matter not only for the results, but also for internal 
processes, rules and organizational routines inherent to the insti-
tutions. According to the procedural ecology argument that we 
have developed here and the case study of Brazil, the process of 
institutional change should consider the systemic variables, along 
with the endogenous and exogenous factors. Thus, understanding 
the systemic factors of institutional development involves consi-
dering: (1) - the flow and sequencing of processes internal to the 
system; (2) - the agents behavior with regard to institutional inte-
ractions; (3) - the establishment of joint organizational goals for 
the system; (4) - the control and use of information by the system 
elements; (5) - the response to internal situations and demands on 
the part of each of the elements of the system; (6) - the response 
to external situations and demands on the part of each of the 
elements of the system.
By considering these analytical factors whenever appropriate, 
the process of change can be understood in terms of the interde-
pendence between institutions. These factors affect the institutional 
development process, favoring either change or the status quo. 
Systemic variables thus influence institutional incrementalism, in 
a way that the agents still prefer incremental changes in routines 
and processes in response to endogenous and exogenous environ-
mental factors. However, this incrementalism may result either in a 
differentiation and greater closing of each of the system elements, 
favoring institutional conflict, or it can lead to an incremental 
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process that is capable of, through cooperation and coordination of 
system elements, driving the process of interdependence between 
overlapping and complementary institutions. 
The theoretical contribution of this study focused on the concept 
of procedural ecology an aims at advancing the theories of institu-
tional change. The case study of the Brazilian system of accounta-
bility institutions made it possible to point out that systemic varia-
bles, present in the interaction between institutions, are important 
into any study of institutional change processes. Systemic variables 
can create situations of change or reinforcement of the status quo 
depending on the context of cooperation or conflict between the 
institutions of an organizational cluster. Procedural ecology is then 
important when considering institutional development, in which the 
incremental changes are directed not only at the rules and routines 
internal to the institutions, but also at the institutions’ interactions.
The empirical contribution is to consider that the development of 
accountability institutions in the case of Brazil can be studied with 
reference to systemic variables. The fight against corruption and 
the control of public administration has advanced in the country 
due to incremental changes in the institutions, which enabled them 
to change internal rules and routines. This generated fundamental 
learning, advancing institutional capacity to exercise control over 
the bureaucracy and political institutions. However, the system still 
results in low efficiency, due to systemic factors, especially in the lack 
of sequencing and complementariness in control actions, breaking 
the accountability cycle exactly in the moment in which public offi-
cials are starting to be called to account for their acts. Unfortunately, 
this has lead to the persistence of impunity perception despite the 
notable recent advances of the Brazilian accountability institutions.
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Resumo
Este artigo analisa o processo de mudança institucional nas instituições 
de accountability no Brasil, com foco em processos endógenos, exógenos 
e sistêmicos. Os estudiosos geralmente analisam a mudança institucional 
considerando fatores explicativos endógenos e exógenos para falar 
sobre a direção e os resultados das mudanças. Além desses dois fatores, 
este trabalho propõe um terceiro. Este artigo propõe que o processo 
de mudança institucional deve ser entendido em termos de variáveis 
sistêmicas e deve levar em conta as interações entre instituições como 
um fator relevante na explicação do veto ou promoção da mudança 
institucional. Com base em evidências qualitativas coletadas de entrevistas 
com os principais atores das instituições de accountability no Brasil, o 
artigo discute as mudanças incrementais ocorridas nestas instituições. 
Demonstramos que, apesar dessas mudanças incrementais, o resultado 
final em termos de mudança institucional não foi uma mudança sistêmica 
mais ampla, com maior cooperação e coordenação das atividades 
de controle entre as instituições de accountability. Os processos de 
accountability são entendidos como parte de um sistema dinâmico, 
segundo o qual a concorrência e a cooperação fazem parte do repertório 
de ação dos agentes e são usados de forma diferente dependendo da 
situação.
Palavras-chave: mudança institucional, accountability; ecologia 
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Abstract 
This article analyzes the process of institutional change, focusing 
on endogenous, exogenous and systemic processes. Scholars usually 
analyze institutional change considering endogenous and exogenous 
explanatory factors to talk about the direction and outcomes of the 
changes. In addition to these two factors, this paper proposes a third one. 
This paper proposes that the process of institutional change should be 
understood in terms of systemic variables and should take into account 
the interactions between institutions as a relevant factor in explaining the 
veto or promotion of institutional change. Based on qualitative evidence 
gathered from interviews with key accountability actors in Brazil, the 
paper discusses the incremental changes that occurred in the Brazilian 
accountability institutions. We demonstrate that, despite these incremental 
changes, the final result in terms of institutional change was not a broader 
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systemic change with greater cooperation and coordination of control 
activities between accountability institutions. Accountability processes 
are understood as part of a dynamic system, under which competition 
and cooperation are part of the action repertoire of accountability actors 
and used differently depending on the situation. 
Keywords: institutional change; accountability; procedural ecology; 
incrementalism; Brazil.
Recebido em 08 de março de 2019
Aprovado em 30 de março de 2019
